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I. Introduction
r
These is an ongoing debate with regard to the "Timing and Se-
quencing of Liberalization" in LDC's. The "Capital Account or
Trade Account Firsf'-Puzzle is tackled with different methodolo-
gical tools of analysis, ranging from the "Political Economy
Approach" put forward by D. Lai (1987) to the orthodox "Price and
Resource Movement Analysis" by S. Edwards (1986).
D. Lai favours a sequencing in which exchange controls are remov-
ed first, introducing a free floating exchange rate, and a phased
program of trade liberalization should follow. If, instead, trade
liberalization is accompanied by a managed exchange rate system
requiring capital controls, the real exchange rate will be af-
fected severely by the nominal exchange rates chosen by the go-
vernment. These choices, in turn, will seldom correspond to the
economic requirements as reflected in the balance of payments.
When deficits occur, governments may then be tempted to impose
new trade controls - "thus aborting the trade liberalization"
(Lai 1987, p. 290).
v ^ •
S. Edwar,ds,, on the other hand, comes to the conclusion that both
types of liberalization, on their own, generate by tendency oppo-
* t'
site effects on* priqes, production, factor allocation and income
distribution. As resource movements are not for free, net reallo-
cation costs can be minimized by synchronising the opening of the
capital and current accounts. However, given the fact that the
capital account tends to adjust faster than the current account,
the "synchronization of the economic effects of opening both
accounts will require that the current account is opened first"
(Edwards 1986, p. 210).
Both approaches seem to be conceptually uncomplete: D. Lai omits
to compare the three relevant exchange rate regimes which may be
implemented during a trade liberalization process: free, managed
and fixed exchange rate. Also, his analysis is not clearcut with- 2 -
regard to the real exchange rate effects of a trade liberaliza-
tion.
Whereas Edwards is explicit in analyzing the impact of liberali-
zation (capital, current account) on the real exchange rate, he
does so in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework where domestic demand is
exogenous and prices are determined solely by input costs. Also,
he claims the relevance of substitutionary and income effects
generated by a trade liberalization. Due to his merely supply-
side oriented procedure these effects are not really incorporated
into the analysis. Moreover, they are introduced in a "deus-ex-
machina" fashion (see Edwards 1986, pp. 192/193), which is not
convincing.
The following contribution aims at overcoming the mentioned defi-
ciencies: our focus will be, however, on trade liberalization
alone, although the exchange rate environment and, thus, the
prevailing capital account scenarios can be varied.
The presentation will make use of a concept which has been put
forward most recently as "True Protection" (Sjaastad 1982, Green-
away/Milner 1987). "True Protection" basically deals with the
measurement and analysis of trade barriers and is located in the
tradition of relative-prices-analysis. The analytical framework
used draws heavily on a pioneer article by Rudiger Dornbusch
(1974); his approach, however, is perfectly capable - as Khan/
Zahler (1987) have shown - of reversing the investigation target,
that is to say to analyze the effects of trade liberalization.
With this aim, the present article suggests that this approach
should be called "True Exposure".
The paper is organized as follows: In chapter II, "True Exposure"
will be conceptually explained from three different approaches
("Shifting Principle", "Graphical Presentation" and "Analytical
Version"). Afterwards, in chapter III, we will proceed to the
discussion of price, exchange rate and income effects of a trade- 3 -
liberalization with the means of comparative static equilibrium
analysis. Also, the transition process - which is a temporary
disequilibrium - between the original and the new equilibrium is
dealt with. Special emphasis is put on alternative exchange rate
regimes which will hopefully deliver some conclusions with regard
to the "sequencing of liberalization debate". Finally, chapter IV
will cover some further fields of research and points to be cla-
rified. A short summary (chapter V) concludes the paper.
II. True Exposure; An Exposition of its Dimensions
II.1 The "Shifting Principle"
The direct impact of a tariff reduction or elimination is the
decrease in the domestic price of importables. The extent to
which importables are truly "liberalized" depends on how much
their relative price is reduced. The "relative price" is meant to
be the price of a good in terms of its competing goods' prices,
and, thus, the prices of nontradeables and exportables.
To illustrate our considerations the following two examples can
be given:
(i) with prices of nontradeables decreasing as much as those of
importables - after a tariff reduction - true exposure of
importables is zero;
(ii) with prices of nontradeables declining less than those of
importables, the true liberalization rate is smaller than
the nominal rate.
Following Greenaway/Milner, "we assume that commercial policy
interventions take the form of uniform tariffs on imports
and/or uniform subsidies on exports" (1987, p. 202),- 4 -
Case (i) represents a situation where importables and nontrade-
ables are perfect substitutes which implies that - in the long
run - their relative price must equal one. Case (ii) stands for
the comparatively "normal" relationship between importables and
nontradeables, the two being imperfect substitutes. Analogously,
examples can be constructed, mutatis mutandis, for the incidence
of tariff reductions on exporters.
Hence, the true exposure concept emphasizes the shift of import
price reductions on to exportables and nontradeables after a
trade liberalization. The extent of this shift depends "essen-
tially on the degree of substitutability (in demand and pro-
duction) between the products of the importable sector and the
other unprotected sectors" (Greenaway/Milner 1987, p. 201).
II.2 A Graphical and Analytical Presentation
Consider a small open economy which produces and consumes non-
tradeables, importables and exportables. The domestic prices of
importables (M) and exportables are determined by their inter-
national prices (*) , the nominal exchange rate (E) and domestid











(2) Px = E P* (1 + s)
For the sake of simplicity we will assume s to be zero. Thus, the
"domestic terms of trade" are given by
(3) ^ = p| (1 + t)
X X- 5 -
Prices of nontradeables are in an equilibrium when the market for
nontradeables clears. This, in turn, is associated with a balance
of trade equilibrium, when income (Y) equals absorption (A):
(5) A = ^ + A,j + Ax
(6) Y - A = (YN -Aj,) + (Yx - Ax) + <YM - A,,) = = 0
X -M
(6a) ^ - YN = X - M
Or, as (6a) demonstrates, when income equals expenditure (Y- A =
0) an excess demand for nontradeables will always be accompanied
by a balance of trade surplus (Dornbusch 1974, p. 180). Theoreti-
cally, it can be removed by a rise in the price of nontradeables
and/or a drop in the price of tradeables, consequently an appre-
ciation of the nominal exchange rate. Hence, with (6) prevailing,
demand for nontradeables is assumed to be a mere function of
relative prices:
P P
(7) DN = DN (-^ ^-p^ )
Let us assume that nontradeables are substitutable for export-




(8) SM = SX7 ( „ -n )
All prices (P , P , P ) are then simultaneously explained, when
M. A IN
the market for nontradeables clears [ (7) equals (8) ] and the
relative price of traded goods (3) is exogenously given. The
latter can be represented graphically by a ray through the origin
P P
(OT) in a (-r—/ —r— ) diagram. The market equilibrium for non-
*N N- 6 -
tradeables is a negatively sloped schedule (NN) whenever "home
goods substitute with both tradeables. A fall in P., (relative) to
P generates negative excess demand for nontradeables and must be
offset by an increase in Px (relative to PN) " (ibid, pp. 202/
203) . Total equilibrium is where OT and NN intersect (A) , as
depicted in Figure 1.
A full trade liberalization connected with a drop of the tariff
rate (t) to zero rotates OT to OT' as the domestic relative price
of exportables in terms of importables rises by the amount of the
nominal tariff reduction (Greenaway/Milner 1987, p. 203). The
first impact of the tariff reduction will thus consist of a
lowering of the price of importables "in terms of both export-
ables and home goods by the amount of the tariff, so that the
economy would find itself at point C" (Dornbusch 1974, p. 180).
At C, however, there is an excess supply (SN > D ) of non-traded
goods. At a fixed nominal exchange rate and prices fully flexible
downwards, a new market equilibrium for non-traded goods (B) can
be attained through subsequent price reductions of home goods.
"The change in the price of importables relative to home goods"
(Greenaway/ Milner 1987, p. 204) serves now as a measure of the
"true exposure effect" (TEE) the tariff reduction has on the
sector of importables:
Mutatis mutandis, the "true export subsidy effect" is given by
(8) TES* =
As Dornbusch pointed out (1974, p. 179), the original NN curve
was "constructed... so that along the schedule real income is
constant" (ibid). This implies the total redistribution of tariff
proceeds by the government to compensate the direct reduction of- 7 -







"purchasing power of a given level of spending" (Dornbusch 1980,
p. 65) .
Rewriting (7) and (8) in percentage changes considering the mar-
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where a circumflex (~) indicates a percentage change and the n's
"represent the demand elasticities for home goods with respect to
the prices of importables and exportables, and e and e are the
III J\,
corresponding supply elasticities" (Oyejide 1986, p. 46). , .• :.
Rearranging (11) leads to:







(14) y = n - e > 0
'x x x
as nx, nm > 0 and em, ex < 0
From (12), it follows that













It is reasonable to assume the production of home goods c.p. to
decline when the prices of importables and exportables rise.- 9 -
Y Y




as Ym + Yx - 1
The incidence parameter u (0 £ a> £ 1) tells us how much of a
tariff reduction (at a given exchange rate E and international
prices P*) is shifted to the producers of non-traded goods. With
o» equal to one "true exposure" of importables is nil whereas an to
of zero reveals that producers of importables have to bear the
full consequences of trade liberalization.
Further examination of u> shows that - as Greenaway and Milner put
it - "it is an index of substitutability... in production and
demand" (ibid, p. 207) between nontradeables and importables (13)
on the one hand and between nontradeables and exportables (14) on
the other hand.
So far, our presentation has been basically a review of "True
Protection" literature, however, with an inverse focus. In the
following, it will be shown how this concept can contribute to
evaluate price, exchange rate and income effects of a trade li-
beralization which were not rigorously considered by Lai and
Edwards. The general equilibrium properties of "True Exposure"
have more ad- than disadvantages: Although we deal in economic
reality primarily with economic disequilibria, it makes sense to
start any discussion of policy effects in an equilibrium frame-
work. Even if it only serves as a term of reference, as the wide-
spread partial equilibrium settings - like the one presented by
Michaely (1986) - cannot demonstrate the supply-demand-interac-
tions in a three-goods, two-factors world.- 10 -
III. True Exposure; New Answers to Old Questions?
III.l Price Effects of a Trade Liberalization
So far, we have basically dealt with the adjustment of relative
prices in the course of a trade liberalization. However, "true
exposure" also offers insight into the development of absolute
prices. This issue is important, for example, when the effects of
a trade liberalization on the overall price level and/or the
inflation rate are to be investigated.
Even in most recent literature there is still a lot of vagueness
if not confusion about what happens to the prices of non-traded
goods when import tariffs are removed: "The local-currency prices
of import substitutes would presumably need to fall by roughly
the same amount as the prices of imports. Under reasonable
assumptions about demand and supply elasticities, the local-
currency prices of non-traded goods would also need to fall
significantly, though less than those of import substitutes"
(Mussa 1987, p. 65) .
In believing so, Mussa considers only final goods and is not
concerned with imported inputs used in the production of non-
tradeables and/or exportables. This simplification applies also
to our own presentation .
The "reasonable assumptions" mentioned by Mussa refer to the
substitutability between the three goods with regard to con-
sumption and production. All of these relationships are for-
tunately reflected in o>.
Let us consider first the theoretically possible cases in pro-
duction:
Buffie (1984) has extended the analysis of trade liberalization
by allowing - within his model - "imported inputs to be used in


































Factor Intensities and Substitutability in the Production of
Nontradeables, Importables and Exportables
Factor Intensities Substitutabilty
X and N; M and N
M and N; X and N
X and N; X and M
X and M; X and N
X and M; M and N
M and N; M and X
Of course, for a typical LDC of today only some out of the total
sample of six cases will be relevant. Greenaway/Milner argue that
case 1 is "probably appropriate for LDC's pursuing import substi-
tute policies and exporting mainly traditional exports" (Green-
away/Milner 1987, p. 215).
Edwards (1986, p. 190) , on the other hand, also considers for
LDC's case 3 which claims exportables to have a higher capital-
labor ratio than nontradeables.
The cases 4 and 5_ may occur, if at all, in industrialized coun-
tries where the supply of advanced services is linked to a highly
capital-intensive technology. Case 2 can be attributed, for ex-
ample, to "traditional" developed countries showing a compara-
tively high endowment with capital which is then reflected in
their export production (Heckscher-Ohlin). Due to their specia-
lization, imports will result in comparatively labor-intensive
products.
Case 6, finally, may be found in newly industrializing countries
which partly have lost their comparative advantage in exporting
labor-intensive goods to the so-called "second tier countries"
and are now switching to more capital-intensive exports (Singa-
pore) .- 12 -
In order to keep the analysis operational and in an admissable
way simple the following three assumptions should hold:
(i) There is perfect symmetry between production and consump-
tion with reference to substitutability and
(ii) a lack of substitutability is interpreted as complementari-
ty;
(iii) those goods that are located at the "extremes" of the fac-
tor-intensities-sequence do not show any significant mutual
substitutability.
Cases 1 and 2 are well represented by the NN schedule in Figure
1: with given domestic prices of exports, prices of nontradeables
obviously fall [ (PV/PM).. < |Pv/P..)n] after the tariff reduction. X N 1 X N 0
Consequently, a true export subsidy is given.
Cases 3 and 4 "normally" stand for a weak/semi-strong substitut-
ability between X and N/a weak/semi-strong complementarity
between M and N. If X and N were perfect substitutes, the rela-
tive price of importables and nontradeables would not exert any
more influence on demand and supply of nontradeables (a, = b.. =
2 0, see Appendix) . The market equilibrium schedule NN now becomes
a vertical line as depicted in Figure 2 and by definition, the
export sector is not affected by the tariff reduction. With less
than perfect substitutability between X and N, the NN schedule
resembles the one of Figure 3. Now, the prices of nontradeables
must have risen as (PX/PN)« > (P /N)Q. This result, in turn,
signifies a "true export tax".
So far, we continue to regard the exchange rate as fixed.
2
In that case, M and N are perfect complements and the ratio at
which they are consumed/produced is not affected by relative
price changes.
With unchanged prices of nontradeables, hence, true exposure
equals the nominal tariff reduction!Bibllothek










a?Figure (Case 5+6) Figure 5
N- 15-
Finally, the cases 5 and 6 consider weak/semi-strong or perfect
substitutability in production and consumption between M and N
(a2 = b2 = 0, see Appendix) . In the latter case (Figure 4) , NN




 This interesting case is worth for a de-
tailed description of the adjustment process.
The initial drop in the price of importables due to the assumed
tariff reduction will cause resources to be diverted from the
production of importables towards the production of nontrade-
ables. Demand, in turn, will shift from nontradeables to import-
ables. As a result, prices of nontradeables will decrease; this
process tends to continue - if imoprtables and nontradeables are
perfect substitutes - "until the initial relative price is re-
stored" (Greenaway/Milner 1987, p. 206). The tariff reduction,
hence, lowers in this instance the price of both importables and
nontradeables. As, by assumption, there has" been no change in the
price of exportables, these goods "earn" the total benefit of
liberalization as their relative profitability increases relative
to both importables and nontradeables.
Again, the comparatively "normal" situation of a weak/semi-strong
substitutability between M and N is characterized by the NN sche-
dule in Figure 5. In both cases (Figure 4, Figure 5), the prices
of nontradeables will have to decline reducing "true exposure" at
the margin (Figure 4) to zero.
With regard to those cases (1,3,6) which we found relevant for
LDC's/Newly Industrializing Countries, the following conclusion
can be drawn:
The stronger the substitutability between nontradeables and im-
portables in production and demand, the greater the likelihood
for decreasing prices of nontradeables in the course of a trade
liberalization. This implies, mutatis mutandis, that the proba-
bility for a nontradeables
1 price increase rises with the degree
of complementarity (in production and demand) between importables
and nontradeables.- 16 -
III.2 Exchange Rate Effects of a Trade Liberalization
After having analyzed relative and absolute price effects follow-
ing a trade liberalization, it is reasonable to proceed to the
implications for the country's key exchange rates. There is no
disagreement concerning the statement that import liberalization
is supported by a depreciation of the purchasing power parity
(PPP) real effective exchange rate, "which is desirable to main-
tain export competitiveness " (Lai 1985, p. 649). Also, a depre-
ciation of the real exchange rate, which favours the production
of tradeables, is called for. .
In order to evaluate the impact of a tariff reduction or abo-
lition on. the two key exchange rates - (i) the real exchange rate
(e) as the internal price of tradeables and nontradeables and
(ii) the purchasing power parity real effective exchange rate
(ep) which measures the degree of external competitiveness of a
country - we will integrate the "true exposure equation" (1.5).
into an own small exchange rate model:
(17) ep = E ' PF/PD PPP - REER
with .
P = Foreign Price Level
Pn = Domestic Price Level
(18) e = Pm/PN Real Exchange Rate
with
PN = Price of Nontradeables in Domestic Currency
PT = Price of Tradeables in Domestic Currency
(15a) PN = P^ P* ~ True Exposure Equation- 17 -
(19) PT = Pg Px
1"^ Tradeables' Price Equation
(20) PD = P| P^
1"^ Domestic Price Equation
(1) PM = E * P* (1 + t)
(2) Px = E * P* (1 + s)
Endogenous: e, ep, PM, PN, PT, PD, Px
Exogenous: P*, P^, PF, E, t, s
Solving for the real exchange rate (e) in terms of percentage
changes gives:
(18a) g = [P* + (1 + t) + E](o - u) + [P* + (l'+S) + E] (u - a)
From this expression it can be seen that the effect of a change
in t or an abolition of t on the real exchange rate depends on
the share of importables in the price index for tradeables, a,
and the shift paramter, w.
Import tariff reductions will result in a depreciation of the
real exchange rate c.p. (E = P* = 0) if and only if
(21) u > a
Under the same condition reductions in export subsidy rates will
lead to real exchange rate appreciations. The analogous ex-
pression for the PPP - REER, ep, is:
(17a) e*p = E - [P* + (l^t) + E][ga + tt - 3) u>]
- [P* + (l^s) + E][g(l -a ) + (1 -B ) (1 -- 18 -
As it always holds that
(22) 3a + (i _ 8) w > o
an "improvement" (depreciation) of ep in the course of a tariff
reduction is guaranteed. This result, however, is not surprising,
as it has been yet often shown in other contributions.
Thus, a simultaneous achievement of depreciations of the two key
exchange rates is feasible. This result is quite different from
Deepak Lai's (1985, pp. 699) according to which "a rise in ta-
riffs will lower the real exchange rate... but will lead to a
rise in PPP real effective exchange rate". Moreover, ..."a suc-
cessful liberalization of the trade account will require a real
devaluation of the domestic currency" (Edwards 1984, p. 8). The
condition to meet this requirement is shown by (21).
III.3 Income Effects of a Trade Liberalization
As with the imposition of tariffs, the occurrence of income
effects in the course of a trade liberalization is a function of
government's behaviour: without compensation (recollection of
former tariff proceeds by other means) "purchasing power at a
given level of spending" (Dornbusch 1980, p. 65) is c.p. in-
creased. This important condition which was discussed by
Dornbusch already in his 1974 contribution (pp. 178-181) has not
been explicitly recognized by recent papers dealing with "true
..1 protection .
Greenaway/Milner (1987) , pp. 200-219) for example, do not even
mention the government's role and just "assume" real income to
be constant.- 19 -
Along the NN schedule real income is constant if and only if
foregone tariff proceeds are simultaneously recollected when
varying the tariff rate (downwards). Then, only substitutionary
effects are reflected by the NN curve (Dornbusch 1974, p. 179)
and the demand elasticities introduced in (11) represent "pure
substitution elasticities" (Dornbusch 1980, p. 64).
Furthermore, holding real expenditure constant enables us to
"decompose the price elasticity of our demand for domestic goods
in an income effect and (the already mentioned) pure substitution
effect" (v. Wijnbergen 1984, p. 471) .
This takes into account that tariff reductions which affect the
relative prices in an open economy "exert both income and sub-
stitution effects" (Dornbusch 1980, p. 4). Any demand elasticity
"can therefore be split up into these two effects" (ibid, p. 64) .
Thus, the compensated or "pure" price elasticity n defined above
is attained, when the income effect, m, is subtracted from the











It is obvious from (6) that the shift parameter, _, will c.p. be















Also, it holds that
Ub
) dm ~
 dTlm dm "
 X- 20 -
Therefore,
< 0
Hence, from (18a) it can be concluded that the likelihood for a
real exchange rate appreciation c.p. increases directly with the
strength of the income effect.
I.II.4 Means of Adjustment After a Trade Liberalization
Within the "true exposure" setting, the "first round impact" of a
trade liberalization (A-> C, Figure 1) through tariff reduction/
abolition has to be a trade balance deficit in conjunction with
an excess supply of nontraded goods in the domestic market. "The
requisite adjustment (C -> B, Figure 1) is one of relative prices"
(Dornbusch 1974, p. 181). There is no debate about this. No un-
animity, however, exists when the contribution of the nominal
exchange rate to the adjustment process is questioned:
(i) Following Dornbusch, from a theoretical point of view, it
is totally "immaterial" (ibid) whether the adjustment is
attained through declining absolute prices of nontradeables
at a fixed exchange rate, or by a depreciation of the no-
minal exchange rate with given nominal prices of home goods
(ibid, p. 180).
(ii) On the other hand, Mussa (1987, p. 66) argues that in praxi
"the best exchange rate policy to accompany a major trade
liberalization is likely to be a modest nominal devalua-
tion. .."
His reasoning is based on two different time perspectives:- 21 -
(a) As a secular matter, "a minimum appropriate devaluation
is one that would avoid a decline in the long-run equili-
brium level of domestic prices" (ibid, p. 66).
(b) In the short-run, there is need for "an adjustment to
avoid the deflationary consequences of trade liberaliza-
tion" (ibid).
(iii) Finally, Corden (1986, p. 16) has pointed out that the
desired real depreciation accompanying a trade liberali-
zation - even if condition (21) would principally hold -
"will not be some automatic. Other things equal, there has
to be some nominal depreciation ... in the absence of down-
ward flexibility of nominal wages and non-tradeable prices
..." (ibid).
These three positions - to be discussed in the following - do
basically represent the possible alternatives for exchange rate
regimes being implemented during a trade liberalization. Whereas
Dornbusch (a) implicitly favours a fully flexible nominal ex-
change rate, Mussa (b) finds some advantage in managing it.
Corden (c) , finally, questions the costs implied when the ad-
justment process runs with a fixed exchange rate.
Transfered into the "sequencing debate", the alternatives men-
tioned correspond to a fully liberalized (a) , more or less con-
trolled (b) and a severely controlled (c) capital account.
(i) If adjustment is left only to the exchange rate - in a
flexible exchange rate environment this would come about by
a market determined depreciation of the domestic currency -
"the final goods terms of trade" (v. Wijnbergen 1984, p.
46}.) or PPP-REER (equation 17) increases comparatively
more. This is due to the fact that nominal prices of non-
traded goods enter into ep only according to their share
(1-3) in domestic prices, whereas the nominal exchange rate- 22 -
is not, under such a constraint . From this point of view,
Dornbusch's assertion applies only to the real exchange
rate, e. But there is another aspect in Dornbusch's state-
ment. According to Lai (1987) the opening of the capital
account implicates "the removal of exchange control and the
2
institution of free float..." (1987, p. 290) . The floating
will be free instead of dirty whenever the Central Bank
abstains from interventions. Thus, in a "capital account
first" environment external competitiveness will c.p. be
(26) ep = (1 - 3)e (Warr 1986, p. 303). We assume, that the
demand for non-traded goods is a function of the real exchange


























Assuming P* = P* = 1 (Garcia Garcia 1981, p. 19), t = s = 0
(after a trade liberalization) the movement from C to B (see
Figure 1) can be achieved either through a depreciation of the
nominal exchange rate, E > 0 or by a decline in the prices of
non-traded goods, p\- < 0:
(2b) —i = E -
This implies (Garcia Garcia 1981, p. 19) also, that the demand
for imports and the supply of exports are functions of the real
exchange rate, not of the final goods terms of trade.
2
"Lai has proposed that a floating-exchange-rate system with
full currency convertibility be implemented before the trade
reform takes place. This means, of course, that the capital
account should be liberalized before the trade account (Edwards
1984, p. 8).- 23 -
improved by a trade liberalization more than in a situation
where the opening of the capital account comes afterwards.
Although, one should remember that ep reflects the purchas-
ing power parity theorem and "movements in it can conse-
quently be thought of as capturing deviations from purchas-
ing power parity" (Warr 1986, p. 303). If the theorem is
valid such deviations can only persist in the short-run.
Secondly, ep can be misleading as an index of competitive-
ness as - following a devaluation for example - "the index
will misinterpret the actual increase in tradeables
1 prices
as an increase in costs, through its effect on the price
level. This will appear as an erosion of the ... gain in
competitiveness achieved" (ibid, p. 304) "directly" by the
increase of E and the numerator of ep.
(ii) a) The "long-run equilibrium level of domestic prices" in a
small country under a fixed exchange rate regime is nothing
but the foreign price level . After a removal of trade
distortions (tariffs, subsidies) prices which are flexible
downwards will c.p. tend to adjust to the foreign prices. A
total "assimilation" may be detained by sticky domestic
prices causing an appreciation of the final goods terms of
trade/a loss in competitiveness. However, as Lai (1987, p.
290) puts it, "the government will have to judge the pre-
cise extent of the nominal exchange rate change required to
yield the appropriate real exchange rate". Misjudgements
will lead to disequilibria in the balance of payments "which
the government may be tempted to reduce through import con-
trols - thus aborting the trade liberalization" (ibid).
There is, again, an argument in favour of a flexible ex-
change rate environment when a trade liberalization is to be
implemented.
"... (as long as there are no demand pressures) the domestic
rate of inflation will slowly converge through time to the
international rate of inflation" (Edwards/Edwards 1987, p. 43).- 24 -
b) M. Khan and R. Zahler (1987, pp. 51, 52) have shown that
there is an endogenous effect which lowers the "threat" of
deflation as a consequence of a trade liberalization even
"assuming that inflation is zero initially" (ibid, p. 52) .
In the "worst case" (Figure 4) importables and nontrade-
ables are perfect substitutes and contribute both by the
same percentage to a "reduction in the general price
level, which in turn creates an excess supply of money and
a fall in the domestic interest rate. This stimulates ex-
penditures, that... in the short-run, dampen the fall in
the relative price of nontradeable goods" (ibid). This
"expenditure increasing effect" (ibid, p. 51) is captured
within the "pure exposure concept" by the income effects we
found inherent in demand elasticities (23) .
(iii) Corden's argument essentially refers to the adjustment path
after a trade liberalization when the product wage (W/P )
in the nontradeables-sector is sticky downwards. Referring
to Figure 1, the movement from A to C was identified with
"an excess demand for tradeable goods and excess supply of
nontradeable goods, requiring a fall in (the price of non-
tradeables) ... along OT
1 so as to restore general equili-
brium at point (B)" (Khan/Zahler 1987, p. 51). Thus, at a
fixed exchange rate and a supply surplus/constant product
wage in the nontradeables-sector, unemployment has to
occur. New employment possibilities can c.p. only arise at
lower product wages in the tradeables sector. Given the
sticky nominal wage rate this result has to be brought
about by higher nominal prices of tradeables in domestic
currency. Hence, the real exchange rate depreciation asso-
ciated with the move from C to B (Khan/Zahler 1987, p. 51)
may be achieved by a depreciation of the nominal exchange
rate which, in turn, is "necessary to close the foreign
exchange gap created by the trade deficit" (ibid).
Which is not necessarily the amount, as the share in the do-
mestic price level has to be considered.-26 -
This present paper has shaded some light on TA(CA) , that is to
say on the liberalization of the trade account at an already
liberalized capital account, respectively at a still regulated
capital account, TA(CA).
Mutatis mutandis, the liberalization of the capital account with
a given trade account - either liberalized, CA(TA), or still
regulated, CA(TA) - has still to be evaluated.
As a "rule", the capital-account-first sequencing will be pre-
fered whenever the benefits of
{TA(CA) - TA(CA)} exceed those of
{CA(TA) - CA(TA)} .
V. Summary .
The concept of "True Exposure" which is a reversal of "True
Protection" (Sjaastad, Greenaway/Milner) is located in the tra-
dition of relative-prices-analysis. Depending on the substitu-
tionary relationships between importables, exportables and non-
tradeables in production and demand, the burden of being un-
protected may be shifted from importables to nontradeables after
a trade liberalization. Relative price changes will also affect
exportables, thus, "true export subsidies" or "true export taxes"
can be detected.
The present paper has put forward a graphical and analytical
version of "true exposure", both of them in a general equilibrium
setting which traces back to Dornbusch (1974) and Greenaway/
Milner (1987).
Furthermore, extending as well as deepening the existing litera-
ture, price, exchange rate and income effects of a trade libera-
lization were analyzed revealing the conditions under which- 27 -
(i) prices of nontradeables will decrease, stay constant or
even rise;
(ii) the real exchange rate may appreciate or depreciate in a
fixed exchange rate regime;
(iii) income effects contribute to the likelihood for a real
exchange rate appreciation.
Also, "true exposure" is able to capture the real income effects
due to overall price reductions - when tariffs are removed -
which, in turn, contribute to dampen any deflationary pressures.
Finally, the adjustment process itself - in the course of a trade
liberalization - has been reviewed. The main conclusion derived
is that flexible exchange rates cope better - in comparison with
a fixed exchange rate regime - with the aim of
(i) improving external competitiveness in the short-run;
(ii) reaching the long run equilibrium level of domestic prices;
(iii) avoiding unemployment in an environment of sticky prices
and nominal wages.
Hence, this paper argues for a flexible exchange rate/an already
liberalized capital account accompanying a trade liberalization.
Application of a similar conceptual procedure to the liberali-
zation of the capital account should give some new insights into
the sequencing ("capital account-trade account first") puzzle in
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